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saying, "This is the normal and usual
meaning of the word 'vehicle'."

Department of Legislation
Charles B. Nuffing, Edifor-in-Charge

Professor Dickerson is the author of "Legislative Drafting" and has
often contributed to this Department. His discussion of the "and" and
"or" problem will be of interest not only to legislative specialists but to
other draftsmen as well.

The Difficult Choice Between "And"

and "Or"

By Reed Dickerson, Professor of Law, Indiana University
One of the difficult problems in
writing, particularly in a field such
as legal drafting that calls for high
precision, is to know when to use
"and" and when to use "or". I know
several excellent draftsmen who say
that they develop mental blocks whenever they meet a complicated situation
involving this decision. The lawyers'
recent preoccupation with the mysteries
of "and/or" has distracted attention
from the broader difficulties here.
Fortunately for the courts and the
other readers of definitive legal documents, a correct choice between "and"
and "or" does not always control the
result. This is because the basic principle that language is to be read in its
broadest appropriate context has laid
bare intended meanings unsupported
or denied by a grammatical word-forword construction of the text. This being so, why discuss so pedestrian,
grammatically technical, and almost
minuscule a subject as choosing between "and" and "or"?
The answer is partly that context,
however valuable, does not resolve all
doubts and correct all imprecisions.
Also, because a system of communication should be internally consistent,
grammar should support, rather than
subvert, intended meanings otherwise
revealed. That the choice between
"and" and "or" is of minor importance in the broad range of drafting
problems is not significant because
general clarity is usually the cumulative result of attending to many individually insignificant matters. But
enough of apologies.
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The reader will wonder why the
following analysis ignores the many
court decisions construing specific uses
of "and" and "or". The answer is that
such decisions (being concerned for
the most part with misused language')
are largely irrelevant to this discussion.
Even where they are not irrelevant
they carry no official weight. Although
the courts are the final arbiters of the
meaning of particular litigated documents, their pronouncements are directed in such cases toward extracting
the meaning of the whole document
when viewed in its proper setting,
which means overriding any specific
inconsistent wording. This is different
from saying that courts speak authori.
tatively on the normal factual meanings of words and phrases when read
out of their contexts. In determining
current general usage, the courts have
no official function or special competence beyond the fact that their duties
offer a broad opportunity for acquiring sophistication in this field. There
is, therefore, a vast difference between
a court's saying, "This is what the
word 'vehicle' officially means in this
particular litigated document" and its
1. E.g.. De Sylva v. Ballentine, Guardian, 351
U. S. 570. 573 (1956) reh. den. 352 U. S. 859.
2. Dickerson, LEGISLATIvE DRAFrTNG 85, note 4
(1954). And see works on logic cited in note 4
below. Some logicians would add a third meaning of "or", that of equivalence. Thus, the sentence, "The canine, or dog, is a useful animal",
can be viewed as asserting the equivalence of
the things respectively designated by the words
"dog" and "canine". From this it might seem

that in such a context "or" means "'which is
equivalent to". On the other hand, it seems unnecessary to postulate a third meaning here.
because the use of "or" in the quoted statement
can be justified without it. Thus, the statement
can be viewed grammatically, not as ar assertion of the equivalence of the things to which
the words "dog" and "canine" refer, but as an
assertion that the identical thing may be referred to by either of two alternative names.
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The difference between "and" and
''or" is usually explained by saying that
"and" stands for the conjunctive, connective, or additive and "or" for the
disjunctive or alternative. The former
connotes "togetherness" and the latter
tells you to "take your pick". So much
is clear. Beyond this point, difficulties
arise.
One difficulty is that each of these
two words is on some occasions ambiguous. Thus, it is not always clear
whether the writer intends the inclusive
"or" (A or B, or both) or the exclusive
"or" (A or B, but not both). This long
recognized uncertainty has given rise
to the abortive attempt to develop
"and/or" as an acceptable English
equivalent to the Latin "vel" (the inclusive "or") .2
What has not been so well recognized
is that there is a corresponding, though
less frequent, uncertainty in the use
of "and". Thus, it is not always clear
whether the writer intends the several
"and" (A and B, jointly or severally)
or the joint "and" (A and B, jointly
but not scvcrally). This uncertainty will
surprise some, because "and" is normally used in the former sense. Even
so, the authors of documents sometimes
intend things to be done jointly or not
at all. This idea inheres in the purchase of a pair of shoes (try to buy
one shoe separately!) without, however, posing any grammatical problem. On the other hand, a reference to
"husbands and wives" may create a
grammatical uncertainty as to whether
the right, privilege, or duty extends to
husbands without wives, and vice versa,
or whether it may be enjoyed or discharged only jointly.3 Where such a
doubt exists, it is desirable to recognize
and deal with it.
The former is a statement about things; the
latter, a statement about words. It is questionable, therefore, whether such a use of the disjunctive "or" in the metalanguage involves any
more than a shift in context. Fortunately, the
principle that synonymous expressions are
taboo in legal drafting makes the question for
present purposes moot.
3. Driedger, ThE ComposrIoNe or LEGsLArIO

9 (1957). Some logicians have expressly recognized variations in the use of the word "and".
For example, Frye and Levi, RATIONAL BELIEF
180-181 (1941) contrasts ie eniuimerative "and"
(mere conjunction) with the wholtstic "and"
(conjunction involving logical relation). The
same distinction seems to underlie the differentiation of conjunctive compounds and tin'plicative compounds in Veatch, INTENTIONAL LOGIc

336-339 (1952). See also note 5 below. This distinction is not necessarily the same as that
drawn in the text because, for one thing, the
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Observation of legal usage suggests
that in most cases "or" is used in the
inclusive rather than the exclusive
sense, 4 while "and" is used in the
several rather than the joint sense. If
true, this is significant for legal draftsmen and other writers, because it
means that in the absence of special
circumstances they can rely on simple
"or's" and "and's" to carry these respective meanings. This, incidentally,
greatly reduces the number of occasions for using the undesirable expression "and/or" or one of its more respectable equivalents, such as "A or B,
or both", or "either or both of the
following".
Special circumstances in which it is
unsafe to rely on general usage exist,
on the other hand, wherever the courts
have shown an unfriendly or biased
attitude in "interpreting" language.
Thus, in drafting a criminal statute,
with respect to which the courts are
inclined to legislate restrictively under
the euphemism of "strict construction",
it is safer not to rely on the chance that
"or" will be given its normal inclusive
reading but to say expressly "shall be
fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than three years, or
both".
Another and more perplexing difficulty in the use of "and" and "or" is
that it is often uncertain, because of a
possible conflict between grammar and
immediate context, whether the draftsman has attempted an enumeration
of people or institutions, on the one
hand, or of their characteristics or
traits, on the other. Take the phrase
"every husband and father". If this is
intended as an enumeration of two
classes of persons, that fact can be less
equivocally expressed by saying "every
husband and every father" or, taking
another approach, by saying "every
person who is either a husband or a
father". If, on the other hand, it is
intended as an enumeration of char.
acteristics or traits necessary to identify
each member to be covered, that alternative can be less equivocally expressed by saying "every person who
is both a husband and a father". "
As the foregoing examples show, the
former alternative meaning can be expressed, without changing substance,
either by an enumeration of persons,

using "and", or by an enumeration of
their

identifying

characteristics

or

traits, using "or". This does not say
that "and" means "or". It says that
whether you use "and" or "or" in such
a case depends upon whether you identify the affected persons by enumerating the several classes into which they
may fall or by defining them as a single
class by enumerating their qualifying
characteristics. A corollary of this is
that shifting from "and" to "or" without shifting from a "persons" approach
to a "characteristics or "traits" approach changes the grammatical meaning.
Because of the subtlety of the point,
it may be desirable to clarify it with an
example and explanation that I have
used elsewhere: 6
...Compare, for instance, these two
provisions:
Provision A:
The security roll shall include(1) each person who is 70 years of
age or older;
(2) each person who is permanently, physically disabled; and
(3) each person who has been declared mentally incompetent.
Provision B:
The security roll shall include each
person who
(1) is 70 years of age or older;
(2) is permanently, physically disabled; or
simple package deal is not the only kind of
logical relation that can exist between conjoined entities. Moreover, it seems questionable
that the draftsman of a legal document would
have legitimate occasion to use mere conjunction, that is, to use "and" to connect w olly
unrelated statements. If this is true, the distinction drawn in the text is for the most part
between two kinds of implicative compounds,
to use Veatch's terminology, and does not ordinarily involve conjunctive compounds at all.
For legal instruments, therefore, the distinction
drawn in the text would appear to be more
significant than that drawn, for quite different
purposes, by Frye and Levi or Veatch.
4. Webster's NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIOiARY
(2d ed. 1958) at page 1712 defines "or" only in
its exclusive sense. To the same effect is
Bosanquet, LOGIC. book I, chapter VIII, section
1 (1888). The following agree that usage supports the exclusive "or": Bradley, PRsncIPLES
)F LOGIC. chapter IV (2d ed. 1922), and Ushenko,
THE Tn-osy or LOGIC 45 (1936). In Joseph, Ass

(3) has been declared mentally incompetent.
Although both provisions say exactly
the same thing, "and" is necessary to
provision A because it enumerates
three separate classes of persons each
of which must be included, whereas
"or" is necessary to provision B be.
cause it names a single class of persons by enumerating its three alternative qualifications for membership.
To illustrate some typical problems
involving "and" or "or", I will now
discuss four basic variations of phrase
that are commonly used. The discus.
sion of these variations is not intended
to imply that either "and" or "or", or
the phrases in which they are used, can
be interpreted in specific utterances
apart from the contexts in which they
respectively appcar. Clearly, they cannot. Even so, we are not foreclosed
from making appropriate generalizations about the usual meanings of these
phrases. Instead of disembodying them,
such generalizations imply useful generalizations about the kinds of contexts
in which these phrases tend in legal
experience to appear and, in part, recognize that even when read out of
specific context particular words and
phrases retain much of the flavor of
their usual associations.
One of the normal functions of context is to provide the basis for implyLoic

61 (1933); and Quine, METHODS OF Locic

4 (1950). Whatever general over-all usage may

be, it is believed that general legal usage conforms to Stebbing's statement. In Tarski, IsTRODUCTIOlN
TO LOGIC 21-23 (2d ed. 1946), it is
suggested that "or" be used to denote the inclusive "or" and "either... or" to denote the
exclusive "or".
5. See Driedger, note 3 above, at 8-9. This
uncertainty must be distinguished from that involved in choosing between the joint 'and"
and the several "and". The ambiguity in the
phrase "every husband and lather", unlike that
in the phrase "husbands and wives", lies not
so nuch in the meaning of "and" as in the immediate context in which it appears. Thus, the
central question is not, "What does 'and' mean?"
but, "What is 'and' being used to enumerate?"
This becomes clear when the phrase is used in
a mandatory sentence, e.g., "Every husband and
father shall report annually". In such a case,
"and" is necessarily joint whichever kind of
enumeration is involved. It is easy to confuse
the two issues because in some permissive senINTRODUCTIONs
TO Losc 187 (2d ed. 1916), this is
tences "and" would be several if the enumeraconsidered the "safer" interpretation. On the
tion were of people, but joint if it were of
other hand, Stebbing, A MODERaINTRODUCTION
characteristics.
ro LocIC 70-71 (6th ed. 1948) says: "It is not
Keynes, FORMAL Locic 469 (4th ed. 1901) says
usual to interpret the 'or' in an alternative
that "and and or occurring in a predicate are
proposition as expressing the exclusion of one
understood as expressing a conjunctive or an
alternative. That is, 'or' is consistent with
'perhaps both'...the onus pIrobandi lies on
alternative tern; but occurring in a subject
they are understood as expressing a coniuncthose who assert that the logical interpretation
tive or an alternative proposition." The latter
of 'or' should be exclusive. It cannot be mainis true of the sentence, "John and George are
taned that the common use is exclusive... It
boys", i.e., "John is a boy and George is a oy".
is not to be denied that it is sometimes clear
It is not true of the sentence, "John and, George
that two alternatives exclude each other. But
are friends". McCall, BAsIC LOGIC 70-71 (1948).
the exclusion is due to the nature of the alternNor does it appear to be true of enumerations
atives, not to the form of the proposition." To
of adjectives and other modifiers. Thus, the
the same effect Is Keynes, FORMAL LoGic 278 note
normal interpretation of the sentence, "Red
(4th ed. 1906). The following agree that usage
and white banners are beautiful", is not "Red
"or':
Burtt,
RIGHT
TINKsupports the inclusive
banners are beautiful and white banners are
NG 134 note (3 ed. 1946); Coffey, THE SCIENCE
beautiful", but "Banners that are both red and
or LOGIC 285 (2d ed. 1918): Frye and Levi,
white are beautiful". And see Coffey, THE
RATIONAL BELIEF 178 (1941); Gibson, THE PoBScreNeE or Logic 197-198 (2d ed. 1918).
LEMor LOC 135 (1908); Mace, PRImNCPLES OF
6. See Dickerson, note 2 above, at 85.
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ing limitations on otherwise overly
broad general terms. There is, for instance, no risk in referring to "the
Administrator" in a paragraph or section in which the official is otherwise
identified. Context limits also in other
ways. Thus, the following discussion
recognizes that the grammatical alternatives are conditioned by whether the
enumeration is assumed to appear in
a mandatory or permissive sentence. It
further recognizes that these alternatives are also conditioned by whether
the connective in question links characteristics that are potentially cumulative or mutually exclusive.
More specifically, the examples dealing with the modifiers "charitable" and
"educational" must be appraised in the
light of the fact that these terms are
potentially cumulative in that the same
institution can be both charitable and
educational. On the other hand, those
dealing with the modifiers "hospital"
and "burial" must be appraised in the
light of the fact that these terms are
not potentially cumulative, but mutually exclusive. An expense can be a
hospital expense or a burial expense,
but the same expense cannot be both.
Phrase (1) : "Charitable and educational institutions"
Does this mean:
(a) "institutions that are both char.
itable and educational"; or
(b) "charitable institutions and educational institutions"?
If you tabulate phrase (1), remembering the fact that strings of adjectives are normally used cumulatively,
7
rather than distributiely, you get
this:
"Institutions that are:
"(1) charitable; and
"(2) educational."
Although sense (b) is sometimes intended by this phrase, it is believed
that sense (a), as expressed in the
tabulation, is the normal grammatical
reading, that is, the way it is usually
read in practice. This is true whether
the sentence is mandatory or permis.
sive.
Phrase (1) is therefore a proper way
of expressing the idea of "institutions
that are both charitable and educational". If sense (b) is intended, it is
better to express it as sense (b) is
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expressed above (see also phrase (3),
below), or in some other way different
from phrase (1) .
Compare the phrase "hospital and
burial expenses", in which the modifiers are mutually exclusive. Because
the same expense cannot be both "hospital" and "burial", only sense (b) is
possible, and the phrase can mean only
"hospital expenses and burial expenses". Although the phrase "hospital
and burial expcnses" is shorter and has
the sanction of usage, it would seem
grammatically preferable to say "hospital expenses and burial expenses",
reserving the shorter form for use with
potentially cumulative modifiers where
sense (a) is both possible and intended.
Phrase (2): "Charitable or educational institutions"
Does this mean:
(a) "institutions that are either charitable or educational, but not both";
(b) "institutions that are either char.
itable or educational, or both";
(c) "charitable institutions or educational institutions, but not both"; or
(d) "charitable institutions or educational institutions, or both"?
If you tabulate phrase (2) similarly
to phrase (1) and infer the normal
inclusive "or", you get this:
"Institutions that are:
"(1) charitable;
"(2) educational; or
"(3) both."
It is believed that sense (b) as so
expressed is the normal grammatical
reading. This is true whether the sentence is mandatory or permissive.
Phrase (2) is therefore a proper way
of expressing the idea of "institutions
that are either charitable or educational, or both". If sense (a), (c), or
(d) is intended, it is better to express
it differently from phrase (2).
On examination, it appears that sense
(d), which is apparently different, is
in most cases substantively the same as
sense (b), because it is normally inferred that, if you may or must have
institutions that are either charitable
or educational or both, you may also
have both charitable institutions and
educational institutions. Conversely, it
is normally inferred that, if you may
or must have both charitable institu-
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tions and educational institutions, you
may also have institutions that are both
charitable and educational.
Compare the phrase "hospital or
burial expenses", in which the modifiers are mutually exclusive. Here, sense
(b) is impossible. Sense (c) is also
eliminated if you infer the normal inclusive "or". Instead, it is believed
that sense (a) is the normal grammatical reading. Examination similarly
shows that sense (d) is substantively
the same as sense (a) in most cases,
because, if you may or must pay expenses that are either hospital or burial,
it is normally inferred that you may
pay both kinds.
Phrase (3) : "Charitable institutions
and educational institutions"
Does this mean:
(a) "both charitable institutions and
educational institutions", which may
include institutions that are both charitable and educational; or
(b) "charitable institutions or educational institutions, or both", which
m,-y include institutions that are both
charitable and educational?
If Lhe sentence is mandatory, you
must have both kinds of institutions
(i.e., a "package deal" is intended).
Here, "and" is joint rather than several, and sense (a) is the normal grammatical reading.
If the sentence is permissive, it is
normally inferred that you may have
one kind without the other (i.e., no
"package deal" is intended). Here,
"and" is several rather than joint, and
sense (b) is the normal grammatical
reading.
Compare the phrase "hospital expenses and burial expenses", in which
the modifiers are mutually exclusive.
Here the answers are the same, except
that the possibility of including an expense that is both "hospital" and
"burial" is excluded from both sense
(a) and sense (b).
Phrase (4) : "Charitable institutions
or educational institutions"
Does this mean:
(a) "charitable institutions or edu.
cational institutions, but not both",
which may not include institutions that
are both charitable and educational; or
(b) "charitable institutions or edu7. See second paragraph of note 5 above.
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cational institutions, or both", which
may include institutions that are both
charitable and educational?
If you infer die normal inclusive
"or", sense (b) is the normal grammatical reading. This is true whether
the sentence is mandatory or permissive.
Compare the phrase, "hospital expenses or burial expenses", in which
the modifiers are mutually exclusive.
Here the answer is the same, except
that the possibility of including an
expense that is both "hospital" and
"burial" is excluded from sense (b).
It is interesting to note that for the
cumulative modifiers "charitable" and
"educational" senses (b) and (d) of
phrase (2), sense (b) of phrase (3),
and sense (b) of phrase (4), the normal grammatical ways of reading these
respective phrases, are substantively
the same in any case in which the sentence is permissive. Thus, if you intend
that the person covered by the statute
is to be free to have either, neither, or
both, you may use any of these three
sentences to express the idea:
(A) "He may contribute to charitable or educational institutions."
(B) "He may contribute to charit.
able institutions and educational institutions." Here, "and" is several, not
joint.
(C) "He may contribute to charitable institutions or educational institutions." Here, "or" is inclusive, not
exclusive.

Sentences (B) and (C) differ only
in that the former uses "and", whereas
the latter uses "or". Because both sentences mean the same thing, it follows
that "and" and "or" produce the same
result in such a context. Stating the
matter broadly, we can say that in a
permissive sentence the inclusive "or"
is interchangeable with the several
"and". (Again, this does not say that
"and" means "or". It says that in such
a context the two words are reciprocally related in that the implied meaning of one is the same as the expressed
meaning of the other.)
Of the three ways of extending permission, sentence (B) is to be preferred. Sentence (A) is open to the
objection that its applicability to both
charitable institutions and educational
institutions is based on inference (a
strong one, however). Sentence (C) is
open to the objection that in the wider
context of the statute as a whole it is
more likely that "or" will be read as
exclusive than that "and" will be read
as joint.
With respect to the alternative modifiers "hospital" and "burial", tie same
analysis applies, except that, because
they cannot be cumulative, there is the
fourth alternative of using phrase (1):
(D) "He may pay the hospital and
burial expenses".
As pointed out in connection with
phrase (1), sentence (D) is not as desirable grammatically as sentence (B).
The reader is warned that many of

the foregoing generalizations are based
only on personal observation. So far as
they have not (to my knowledge) been
confirmed by exhaustive scientific investigation they remain subject to
honest skepticism. Even so, they may
retain some value as potential conventions that, if adopted, would ultimately
crystallize the very usages that I believe
them now to reflect. While I do not
rest my analysis on this kind of bootstrap pulling, it is comforting to recognize its supporting effect.
The reader is also warned that, even
if sound, the foregoing generalities on
usage are valid only as observed tendencies. The value of relying on such
generalities is not that they foreclose
all possibility of ambiguity or other
uncertainty (they are incapable of discharging this responsibility). Rather,
it is that they establish probable meanings that, fortified in particular cases
by general and specific context, are
strong enough so that the incidence of
uncertainty remaining after a careful
reading of the whole statement in its
proper setting is reduced to the point
where an attempt to eliminate it altogether would cost more in prolixity and
unreadability than would be gained by
attaining the unattainable ideal of absolute certainty.
While the foregoing analysis is hardly reducible to several handy rules of
thumb, perhaps it will be helpful in
some instances in lessening the confu.
sion that now exists in this area.

Make Your Hotel Reservations Now!
The Eighty-Third Annual Meeting
of the American Bar Association will
be held in Washington, D. C., August
29-September 2, 1960.
The January, 1960, issue of the
JOURNAL carries a complete announcement with respect to hotels, registration, etc., and in requesting accommodations please use the hotel reservation
application therein provided.
Attention is called to the fact that

many interesting and worthwhile events
of the meeting will take place on Sunday, August 28, preceding the opening
sessions of the Assembly and the House
of Delegates on Monday, August 29.
Requests for hotel reservations
should be addressed to the Registration Department, American Bar Association, 1155 East 60th Street, Chicago
37, Illinois, and must be accompanied
by payment of the $35.00 registration

fee for each member for whom reser.
vation is requested. This fee is NOT a
deposit on hotel accommodations but is
used to help defray expenses for services rendered in connection with the
meeting.
Be sure to indicate three choices of
hotels, type of accommodations desired
and by whom you will be accompanied.
We must also have definite dates of
arrival and departure.
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